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ARTICLES 
ON PREEMPTION, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, AND CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 
Mary J. Davis· 
Conflict of laws theory explores how courts should decide which law 
governs a dispute or transaction when more than one legal authority has a 
legitimate connection with the dispute, and thus a legitimate claim to having 
its law applied to it. l Conflict of laws theory, thus, explains the delicate 
balancing act in which courts engage to allocate power among sovereigns with 
overlapping authority. It seeks to promote and accommodate a variety of 
goals in achieving this end: respect for sovereignty, respect for legitimate 
governmental policies and the interests they serve, predictability, certainty, 
and uniformity in the application of law, among others.2 
Similarly, preemption doctrine explains how courts decide which law 
governs a dispute or transaction when more than one governing legal authority 
* Stites & Hatbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; J.O .,Wake Forest 
University School of Law , 1985; B.A, University of Virginia, 1979. Thanks to Professor Richard Ausness 
for his valuable comments, and to Ashley Bruce, University of Kentucky College of Law, Class of2004, 
for her excellent research assistance. 
\. DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONfLICT Of LAws: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS V (6th ed. 2001) 
("Law comes from many sources. In an ideal world, the authority of these sources would be clearly defined 
and neatly demarcated, so that no event or occurrence was ever subject to control by more than one law 
maker or law enforcer. But such is not our world. The power of different bodies to make or administer law 
is often unclear and, even when clear, frequently overlaps. Conflicts arise, and a way is needed to resolve 
them."). 
2. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-17 (2d 00. 1995); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET 
AL., CONFLICT OF LAws § 2.1 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter SCOLES & HAy]; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ \.3,1.5 (4th ed. 2001). 
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within a single legal system has legislated3 in an area encompassing a dispute, 
giving both authorities a legitimate claim to having their law applied to it. In 
our federal system, preemption issues arise most often when both the federal 
government and a state government have defined legal rules which govern a 
situation.4 When our Constitution created a federal government of enumerated 
powers, it created a system of overlapping legal authority. When Congress 
legislates in a field within its enumerated powers, conflicts inevitably arise 
over whether, and how much, state authority has been displaced in the 
process. Overlapping federal and state legal rules often co-exist peacefully. 
When they can, both will apply concurrently. When they cannot, however, 
courts must determine which law prevails. Preemption doctrine addresses 
such conflicts. Preemption doctrine, therefore, is a subset of the larger subject 
of conflict of laws. 
The framers of the Constitution recognized that conflicts of law would 
arise in our federal system and included a provision which defines a basic 
premise for resolving those conflicts: the Supremacy Clause. That Clause 
states that federal law "shall be the supreme law of the land."s The 
Supremacy Clause does not further define when federal law is supreme, 
however, and the circumstances in which federal law is supreme over state law 
3. The term '1egislated" in this context means that a legal principle, either statutorily or judicially 
derived, has been defined by a governing legal authority as applicable to a particular dispute ortransaction. 
"Legislative jurisdiction" can be contrasted with "adjudicative jurisdiction," which refers to the power of 
a court to resolve a dispute involving the parties and the subject matter before it. See generally SCOLES & 
HAy, supra note 2, § 5.17, at 319; WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 114-16 (defining jurisdiction to 
adjudicate). 
4. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: 
Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 Ky . L.J. 913, 917 -25 (2004); see also Mary 
l. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REv. 96"1, 9611 (2002) (providing 
an introduction to preemption). 
Preemption issues also arise when state and local governments have conflicting regulations that 
putatively govern a particular subject. Such preemption issues are similar to those that arise in the 
federaUstate arena. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals, 795 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing right of 
localities to govern in matters of local concern in the context of "the Legislature's transcendent interest in 
regulating matters of Statewide importance"). Local governments exist by virtue of state authority, in 
contrast to our Federal government, which exists as a result of sovereign states ceding authority to it during 
its creation. Therefore, state and local government preemption doctrines involve issues outside the scope 
of this Article. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States v.iJich shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767 (1994) 
(providing background information and studies of the early history of preemption and the supremacy 
clause); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225 (2000). 
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are not self-evident. Any number of situations exist in which it might not be 
desirous for federal legislation to displace state law, but rather that federal 
legislation operate consistently with state law. Furthermore, some 
circumstances may require total federal displacement of even consistent state 
law. And many circumstances in between will require that federal legislation 
displace some, but not all, state law. Determining the circumstances in which 
federal law is supreme, therefore, requires a methodology. 
The Supremacy Clause does not provide that methodology, but rather acts 
as a choice of law provision that operates as a default rule: as between two 
otherwise applicable legal rules, federal and state, the federal law controls.6 
The Supreme Court has long framed the inquiry under the Supremacy Clause 
as a search for congressional intent to displace, or preempt, state law. 7 
Sometimes the Court has found this intent in an express preemption provision 
directed to the issue.8 Sometimes the Court has concluded that an express 
preemption provision does not reliably indicate the proper scope of federal 
displacement of state law. 9 When preemptive scope is not found fully in an 
express provision, the Court has defined the inquiry as a search for "implied 
preemption." At this stage in the Court's methodology, the search is no longer 
for legislative intent to preempt. Rather, the Court is attempting to 
accommodate the conflicting objectives of two sovereigns-federal and 
state-with legitimate claims to authority over the subject. 
6. See Ausness, supra note 4, at 918-19 (noting that some scholars suggest that "the Supremacy 
Clause operates like a 'choice of law' provision to ensure that federal law will prevail over state law in the 
event of a conflict. "). 
7. See, e.g., Cipollonev. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (I 992)(stating that when Congress 
defined the scope of an express preemption provision, with a "reliable indicium" of its iotmt, that scope 
controls the preemption analysis). See Davis, supra note 4, at 968·70. 
8. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 531-32, 545-46 (concluding that preemption analysis should 
proceed by an interpretation of the scope of the express preemption provision); see also Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 512 (1978) (indicating that Congress intended the Employee Retirement and 
Income Security Act (ERISA) to provide express preemption rather than leaving the responsibility to the 
states). 
9. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). The Court stated: 
The fact that an express definition ofthe pre-emptive reach of a statute "implies"-i.e., supports 
a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that 
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption .... At best, Cipollone 
supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not 
establish a rule. 
Id. See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v.Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470,505 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding "clear congressional command" to preempt is required 
to foreclose implied preemption analysis). 
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When the Supreme Court decides that federal law impliedly preempts 
state law, it does so not because Congress in any meaningful sense "intended" 
it, but, rather, in lieu of that intent. The implied preemption methodology 
requires a search for an "actual conflict" between federal and state law. lo 
Upon identifying an actual conflict, the default rule of the Supremacy Clause 
operates and federal law applies. Anything other than an "actual conflict" 
results in the application of state law. Identifying the principles that govern 
the determination of an actual conflict is, therefore, critical to understanding 
implied preemption analysis. 
Choice of law theories incorporate a variety of methods to determine 
whether a true or actual conflict exists between two applicable legal rules. 
Because of the primary importance of respecting sovereign authority in multi-
state choice oflaw problems, as well as federal-state choice oflaw problems, 
there is much at stake in determining the existence of a conflict. This article 
proposes that applying choice oflaw theory to the Court's implied preemption 
analysis sheds light on this difficult, but central, inquiry. When choice oflaw 
theory is applied to the Supreme Court's recent preemption doctrine, the 
underlying factors which have influenced resolution of these important 
preemption issues are clarified. Once clarified, a fuller critique of those 
factors occurs, out from under the cloak of supposed congressional intent. 
Conflicts scholars and jurists for centuries have sought an answer to the 
question of "what law controls?" by balancing a number of considerations. 
Chief among those considerations are the legitimate political and policy 
concerns of conflicting sovereigns. I I This article analyzes the Supreme 
Court's recent preemption decisions with an understanding of these theories 
and their underlying considerations. That analysis reveals that the Court's 
recent preemption decisions incorporate two modem conflict oflaws theories: 
Governmental Interest Analysisl2 and its corollary, Comparative Impairment. 13 
10. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
11. For an excellent explanation of the evolution of conflict of laws theory, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides,American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 11-26 
(2001) (discussing wolks of prominent conflict theorists such as Joseph Story, Walter W. Cook, David F. 
Cavers, Brainerd Currie, Arthur von Mehren, and Russell Weintraub). 
12. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 189 (1963) [hereinafter 
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS]. Professor Currie's work has been analyzed at length and one of the most 
widely regarded explanations is Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie 's Governmental Interest Analysis, 
215 RECUEIL DES CbURS \3 (1990). See BRILMA YER, supra note 2, at 49 n.6 ("It seems likely that 
[Professor Kay's] defense will come to be accepted as the authoritative treatment of Currie's work."). 
13. See generally William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(\963) (discussing deficiencies in current doctrines and suggestions for refonn). 
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Each of these theories builds on the notion that a choice oflaw analysis should 
be motivated by selecting the applicable law based on a study ofthe purposes 
behind the laws in conflict, and choosing the law whose purposes would be 
promoted if applied to the instant case.14 When viewed in this light, often 
there is no underlying purposive conflict in the laws. In that instance, only 
one law should apply-the one whose objectives will be furthered if applied. 
The Supreme Court's implied preemption jurisprudence and its determination 
of those actual conflicts which trigger the application of federal law is 
consistent with these conflict of laws theories. 
In Section I ofthis article, some basic conflict oflaws theory is explained, 
with an emphasis on Governmental Interest Analysis and Comparative 
Impairment. In Section II, the Supreme Court's modem preemption cases are 
discussed to provide a background on current preemption analysis. Torts and 
products liability preemption cases are employed because they raise most 
vividly the important choice courts face in federal preemption matters between 
traditional state regulation through the common law and federal regulation 
through specific proscriptions. Many other preemption issues exist,15 but 
those involving products liability and other tort actions seem most to reflect 
the tension between federal and state interests when regulating fundamental 
matters of public health and safety.16 
Section III integrates the conflict oflaws theories from Section I with the 
preemption doctrine of Section II to explain how the Court's implied 
preemption doctrine uses a modified Governmental Interest Analysis to 
determine whether an actual conflict exists. This section discusses the 
application of Governmental Interest Analysis and its corollary Comparative 
Impairment to preemption doctrine and identifies the value of such an 
14. Much debate in choice-of-Iaw circles has been conducted over the propriety of using a purposive 
approach to choice oflaw, and both Governmental Interest Analysis and Comparative Impairment have 
been praised and criticized in that debate. See, e.g., Symposium, Choice of Law: How it Ought to Be, 48 
MERCER L. REv. 623 (1997). This article does not enter that debate. Rather, it observes that the purposive 
approach to choice of law reflected in many modern choice of law theories, predominantly Governmental 
Interest Analysis and Comparative Impairment, is found in the Supreme Court's preempt ion jurisprudence. 
15. See generally Davis, supra note 4, at 97 (discussing history of preemption analysis generally, 
including cases involving labor, environmental, employee benefits issues, and others). 
16. Indeed, federal preemption of common law tort damages actions has been particularly high 
profile in recent years, causing the most difficulty for the Court in articulating its preemption analysis. See, 
e.g., Ausness, supra note 4, at 913; see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GED. 
L.J. 2085, 2112-17 (2000); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State 
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559 (1997); M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State 
Safety Obligations, 21 PACE L. REv. 103, 104 (2000); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products 
Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REv. 411, 412-13 (2003). 
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analysis. This section notes the important similarities, and acknowledges the 
differences, between the noted conflict of laws theories and their application 
to federal preemption. Most importantly, the conflict of laws principles the 
Court uses to identify actual conflicts are examined and applied. 
Finally, Section IV explains the normative value of Governmental Interest 
Analysis and Comparative Impairment as applied to federal preemption. The 
article argues that the Court's use of Governmental Interest Analysis and 
Comparative Impairment is appropriate to resolve implied preemption cases 
because: (1) it provides a methodology for courts to follow to identify the 
actual conflicts that require federal preemption; (2) it reveals the critical 
factors that influence the analysis under the Supremacy Clause; and (3) it will 
lead to increased predictability in, and understanding of, the application of 
federal preemption. Understanding the underlying conflict of laws inquiry 
provides greater clarity to the Court's otherwise opaque preemption 
jurisprudence. 
I. SOME BASIC CONFLICT OF LAWS THEORy-IN PARTICULAR, 
GOVERNMENT AL INTEREST ANALYSIS AND COMPARA TIVE IMPAIRMENT 
Early choice oflaw theory relied on jurisdiction-selecting rules based on 
predefined, purportedly neutral criteria to select the governing law. 17 Modem 
choice of law theoryl8 seeks instead to effectuate the substantive concerns of 
sovereigns by using content-selecting methods that explore the purposes 
behind the laws in conflict to determine which sovereign has an actual interest 
in vindicating its policy.19 Often that process will determine that only one 
17. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). Story is 
considered the father of the conflict oflaws in the United States. E. LoRENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LA ws 193-94 (J 947). Professor Joseph Beale, the Reporter for the Restatement (First) 
of Conflict of Laws [hereinafter First Restatementl, is the primary twentieth century proponent of a 
jurisdiction-selecting approach to choice of law. Such an approach is based on the notion that rights are 
created based on the laws of places where certain critical events take place. See generally BRILMA YER, 
supra note 2, § 1.2. "A territorially-oriented choice-of-Iaw rule is one that points to a geographical location 
as to the source of the applicab Ie law before any inquiry is made into the content of that law." WEINTRAUB, 
supra note 2, § 3.1, at 52. 
18. Choice of law theory in the United States is said to have undergone a revolution in the mid-
twentieth century. See Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do You Rate a Century?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 89, 
99-107 (2001). A number of choice oflaw theories have been propooed over the past several decades to 
take the place of the traditiona~ jurisdiction-selecting approach of Professor Beale and the First 
Restatement. For an explanation of these theories generally,see SCOLES &HA Y, supra note 2, §§ 2.9-2.13, 
at 25-58. 
19. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 12, at 183-84. 
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